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The Prisoner Transfer Treaty with
Turkey: Last Run for the
"Midnight Express"
I. Introduction
On June 7, 1979, the United States and Turkey signed a bilat-
eral treaty concerning the enforcement of penal judgments' that per-
mits citizens of either country who are convicted of a crime in the
courts of the other country to serve their prison sentence in their
home country.' The treaty is a significant attempt to resolve a much-
publicized problem 3.of great concern to both nations4 - the special
hardship of incarceration in a foreign country.' By its terms, the
1. Treaty on Enforcement of Penal Judgments, June 7, 1979, United States-Turkey, -
U.S.T. - - T.I.A.S. - reprintedin TREATY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY ON THE EN-
FORCEMENT OF PENAL JUDGMENTS, S, EXEC. Doc. BB, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (hereinaf-
ter cited as Turkish Treaty].
2. A sister treaty that includes provisions for extradition and mutual assistance in crimi-
nal matters has also been signed with Turkey. TREATY ON EXTRADITION AND MUTUAL
ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, June 7, 1979, United States-Turkey, - U.S.T. _ -
T.I.A.S. - reprinted in S. EXEC. Doc. AA, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The sister treaty
extends the list of extraditable offenses to include narcotics crimes, aircraft hijacking, obstruc-
tion of justice, bribery, and offenses that are punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.
Id art. 2(l)(a), app. The list of extraditable offenses now totals thirty-three.
The sister treaty also covers mutual assistance in criminal matters and is only the second
of its type in the United States. Essentially, it replaces the traditional procedure of obtaining
evidence from foreign countries with a more efficient method. In the past, a time-consuming
rogatory letter (commission from one judge to another requesting him to examine a witness)
was required. Under the treaty, either party may request assistance in criminal investigations
including taking of testimony or statements of persons, id art. 21 (3)(b), producing documents
or articles of evidence, id art. 21 (3)(c), and service ofjudicial documents, id art. 21 (3)(e). In
addition, the treaty provides for temporary transfer of an American defendant to Turkey to
acquire testimony of a witness and permits the defendant to be present when the request for
testimony is executed. Id art. 32(l).
3. See, e.g., B. HAYES, MIDNIGHT EXPRESS (1977). The book describes the author's
successful escape from a Turkish prison after being incarcerated on charges of smuggling nar-
cotics and was later made into a movie by the same name. See Maslin, Review, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 14, 1978, at C 20, col. 1. See also note 39 infra
4. See Turkish Treaty, supra note 1, at Il, Letter of Transmittal, Message from the
President of the United States to the Senate.
5. An estimated 2,200 American citizens are imprisoned in some seventy-five countries.
See H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1977) (statement of Warren Christopher,
Deputy Secretary, Department of State), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3146, 3176. Mr. Christopher discussed the hardships in depth:
There are special hardships involved in being in a prison abroad. It is difficult or
impossible to maintain contact with one's family or friends. Language problems can
make prison life more difficult. The isolation inherent in being imprisoned abroad
can aggravate the always difficult problems of readjustment after release.
Comparable hardships exist for foreigners in U.S. prisons even though there is
treaty was subject to ratification by both nations and became effec-
tive.6
The Turkish Treaty is the fifth in a series of bilateral prisoner
transfer treaties that began in 1977 with the Treaty on the Execution
of Penal Sentences between the United States and Mexico.7 The
Turkish Treaty, however, arises in a unique legal context. It is the
first prisoner transfer treaty based upon the European Convention in
International Validity of Criminal Judgments (European Conven-
less publicity about them. The problem of prisoners, and the publicity they generate,
has been a burden in our diplomatic relations.
The treaties and this implementing legislation will lift that burden.
Id For further detail on the special hardships resulting from foreign incarceration, see Trans-
fer of Offenders andAdministration of Foreign Penal Sentences. Hearings on S 1682 Before the
Subcomm. on Penitentiaries and Corrections of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1, 120, 123, 129, 293 (1977).
6. Turkish Treaty, supra note I, at art. XXIX(i), (2). The Turkish Treaty was reported
by the United States Senate on November 20, 1979. 123 CONG. REc. S 17123 (daily ed. Nov.
20, 1979). The Treaty had been analyzed in Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on
November 13, 1979. Hearings on Nine United States Treaties on Law Enforcement and Related
Matters Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., ist Sess. (1979) [herein-
after cited as Ratification Hearings]. The instrument of ratification was signed by President
Carter on December 13, 1979. United States Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 1980, at 76.
Ratification of the Treaty was delayed in Turkey until recently by a combination of cir-
cumstances. After being signed by the Government of Turkey in June of 1979, it needed only
to be ratified by the Parliament. The Parliament apparently had no objections to the Treaty
but faced more pressing internal problems including a deteriorating economic situation. See
Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1980 at 1, col. 4 (the government was confronted with an inflation
rate of 70 percent). When the five-man National Security Council headed by General Kenan
Evren seized power on September 12, 1980, it abolished the Parliament and assumed legisla-
tive functions. See New York Times, Oct. 9, 1980, at A3, col. 4.
The ruling junta subsequently gave top priority to salvaging Turkey's precarious econ-
omy. "Eroded by near 100 percent inflation, wobbling under the weight of billions of dollars
of foreign debts, slowed by chronic inefficiencies, by 20 percent unemployment, and by ram-
pant terrorism, the Turkish economy has long been in desperate need of repair." Christian
Science Monitor, Sept. 16, 1980, at 1, col. I. Because of these obstacles, many observers felt
that prospects for early ratification of the Treaty were slim. Telephone interview with Ms.
Zergun Tanyar, Second Secretary in Charge of Consular Affairs, Turkish Embassy, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (September 22, 1980). Nonetheless, on October 8, 1980, the National Security
Council announced approval of the Treaty. See New York Times, Oct. 9, 1980, at A3, col. 4.
The question remains whether approval by the National Security Council without ratifi-
cation by the Parliament is constitutional under Turkey's Anayasa (Constitution). See foot-
notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra. Given the present political situation, however, the
Treaty's constitutionality is not likely to be challenged from within Turkey.
7. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico, 28
U.S.T. 7399, T.I.A.S. No. 8718, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-12
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Mexican Treaty]. The other treaties in the series included the fol-
lowing: Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, July 6, 1979, United States-Peru, -
U.S.T. - T.I.A.S. No. - reprinted in S. EXEC. Doc. II, 96th Cong.,lst Sess. (1979); Treaty on
the Execution of Penal Sentences, Jan. 11, 1979, United States-Panama, - U.S.T. _ T.I.A.S.
No. _ reprinted in S. EXEC. Doc. Z, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Treaty on the Execution of
Penal Sentences, Feb. 10, 1978, United States-Bolivia, - U.S.T. _ T.I.A.S. No. ,4 S. EXEC.
Doc. G, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bolivian Treaty]; Treaty on the Exe-
cution of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, United States-Canada, - U.S.T. _ T.I.A.S. No._
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-23 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Cana-
dian Treaty].
The treaties with Mexico, Canada, and Bolivia are currently in force; those with Panama,
Peru, and Turkey have not yet become effective. All six treaties utilize the original implement-
ing legislation. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3100-3115 (West Supp. 1979).
tion).8 It is also the first treaty of this nature between the United
States and another party to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA). 9
The continued validity of this entire series of treaties has re-
cently been challenged in a federal district court decision. In Velez v.
Nelson, 1o the court granted three prisoners transferred to the United
States under the Mexican Treaty a writ of habeas corpus from fed-
eral prison on grounds that their consent to transfer was involuntary.
The prisoners successfully contended that their consent could not be
voluntary since mistreatment in foreign jails vitiated any choice con-
cerning transfer." Given the present precarious position of the
treaty in Turkey, an affirmation of Velez could result in the demise
of the treaty.' 2 In light of Velez and other criticisms of the Turkish
Treaty, this comment will examine the Treaty and the legal hurdles
it may face in the courts.
II. Geneology and Background of the Turkish Treaty
A. The Mexican Treaty
An offspring of the Mexican Treaty, the Turkish Treaty repre-
sents the logical culmination of a chain of events that began in the
early 1970's. At that time, both the American and Mexican govern-
ments implemented stringent measures to reduce drug traffic.' 3 With
8. May 28, 1970, Europ. T.S. 70, 2 Council of Europe, European Conventions and
Agreements 426 (1972) [hereinafter cited as European Convention]. See notes 31-36 and ac-
companying text infra.
9. The Status of Forces Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty,
June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter cited as NATO
SOFA]. The signatories are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Agreement
went into force on August 23, 1953, and Turkey became a party by accession on June 17, 1954.
The NATO SOFA was intended to clarify the criminal jurisdiction that a foreign nation
may exercise over friendly armed forces stationed within its borders during peace time.
Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1212 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972). When an
American serviceman is alleged to have committed an offense against the law of a foreign
nation, the SOFA governs the place of his pretrial confinement and specifies seven due process
guarantees that the foreign court must follow during trial. NATO SOFA, art. VII(9)(a)-(g). In
addition to uniformed members of the force, the NATO SOFA also applies to members of the
civilian component and their dependents. NATO SOFA, art. I (l)(b), (c).
10. 475 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1979), rev'dsub norn, Rosado v. Civiletti, No. 80-2001/3
(2d Cir. Apr. 23, 1980), pediion for cert. filed 48 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. June 2, 1980) (No. 79-6690).
11. 475 F. Supp. at 874.
12. See note 6 supra. One party may terminate the treaty simply by giving prior written
notice of its intention to the other party. The termination will take effect six months after
receipt of the notification. Turkish Treaty, supra note 1, at art. XXIX (3). See generally
Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the IC, 68 AM. J.
INT'L L. 51 (1974). Mexico has recently lodged a formal protest over the case. Ratification
Hearings, supra note 6, at 15 (statement of Michael Abbell, Director, Office of International
Affairs, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
13. The Nixon Administration declared an international war on drugs attempting to stop
production of narcotics at their source. See U.S. Citizens in Foreign Jails on Drug Related
Charges. Hearings before the Senate Subcomm on Foreign Assistance of the Comm on Foreign
Relations, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1977). See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1977, at 8, cols. 2-4.
the assistance of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Mexican
government vigorously attempted to eradicate drug production and
the use of Mexico as a transshipment point in international drug
traffic. 4 A by-product of these efforts was the apprehension of many
United States citizens. By August 1977, the number of Americans
held in Mexican jails had reached approximately 600.'" The major-
ity of these prisoners were convicted on drug charges, generally pos-
session of marijuana or cocaine.' 6  Subsequently, their families
complained to the press and the State Department of mistreatment
and inadequate living conditions in Mexican prisons.'
7
In response to the adverse publicity in the United States, the
Mexican government proposed a prisoner exchange agreement with
the United States to Secretary of State Kissinger in June 1976. I" Fol-
lowing extensive hearings before several House and Senate commit-
tees, 19 both the Mexican Treaty and a similar treaty with Canada
were ratified2° and appropriate implementing legislation was en-
acted. 2' Congress' rationale for ratifying these treaties was essen-
tially threefold: the treaties would increase the likelihood of
rehabilitation of the offender;22 improve bilateral relations between
14. Penal Treaties with Mexico and Canada: Hearings on Exec. D. and Exec. H Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Foreign Relations Hearings] (prepared statement of Senator John Sparkman); see also id at II
(Mexico was the source of 80% of the illicit drugs entering this country at that time).
15. See Implementation of Treatiesfor the Transfer of Offenders to or from Foreign Coun-
tries. Hearings on HR. 7148 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and Interna-
tional Law ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as House Judiciary Hearings]; see also N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1977, at A 4, col. 3.
16. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1977, § 1, at 41, col. 1.
17. H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3146, 3146.
18. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 15, at 2 (prepared statement of Senator
John Sparkman); 123 CONG. REC. 24,273 (1977) (remarks of Senator Lloyd Bentsen).
19. In late 1975 and early 1976 the House heard testimony substantiating prisoner com-
plaints. United States Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
national Political and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). As a consequence of these hearings, a treaty between the United States
and Mexico was prepared and forwarded to Congress in November 1976. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee held hearings on the treaty and a similar treaty with Canada in June
1977. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 14, at 2. Since the treaties required imple-
menting legislation, hearings were held on Senate Bill 1682 in July 1977. Transfer of Offenders
and Administration of Foreign Penal Sentences;- Hearings on S 1682 Before the Subcomm. on
Penitentiaries and Corrections of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess 1.
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Judiciary Hearings].
20. The Mexican Treaty was unanimously ratified by the Senate on July 21, 1977. See
123 CONG. REC. 24,275 (1977). The Canadian Treaty was ratified July 19, 1977. See 123
CONG. REC. 23,730 (1977).
21. Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-144, 91 Stat. 1212 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 955, 18
U.S.C. § 4100-4115, 28 U.S.C. § 2256). The legislation was intended to implement any future
treaties. See H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1977).
22.
Offender rehabilitation which is one of the primary objectives of United States
penal policy, is facilitated as a result of execution of penal sentences in an offender's
own country. Rehabilitation is less likely to take place where the environment in
which the offender finds himself is unfamiliar and sometimes hostile to him. Recipi-
the respective nations;23 and foster humanitarianism.24
In operation, the treaties have fulfilled these expectations. Over
700 prisoners have transferred to their home countries since the pro-
gram began.25 Moreover, a State Department official has character-
ized the treaties as "a very good experience, beneficial to our foreign
relations and to the individuals affected by those treaties."26
B. International Precedents
Although the United States had never entered into a bilateral
pact of this nature prior to the Mexican Treaty,27 the concept was not
without precedent. Since 1948, the Scandinavian countries have pro-
ents of benefits of this greater possibility for rehabilitation are: (1) the individual
offender and (2) the community into which the offender will eventually return.
Id at 4.
23.
Incarceration of individual [sic] in prisons and institutions of a foreign country
invariably have the effect of straining bilateral relations between the offender's home
country and the foreign country. Conditions existing within a nation's penal facilities
and their reform are not generally high on the list of its legislative priorities. As a
result, despite good intentions, neglect is often found to exist in this area. The effects
of this neglect is felt by foreign prisoners and is not conducive to good foreign rela-
tions.
Id
24. "The most fundamental justification for offender exchange treaties is human rights.
Incarceration in one's own country is severe enough punishment. Service of a custodial term
in a foreign jail creates special hardships upon the individual offender, and his family." Id
25. Ratification Hearings, supra note 6, at 19, 22. The actual tally is as follows: 431
Americans transferred from Mexico; 183 Mexicans transferred from United States; 63 Ameri-
cans transferred from Canada; 43 Canadians transferred to Canada; 9 Americans transferred
from Bolivia; and 3 Bolivians transferred to Bolivia. By November 13, 1979, a total of 732
prisoners had transferred. Id
26. Id at 27 (statement of James H. Michel, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of
State).
27. No precedent exists in the United States for a bilateral pact that would allow prison-
ers to serve foreign sentences in their home country, except an unimplemented provision in the
Korean Status of Forces Agreement. Facilities and Areas and the Status of Forces in Korea
Agreement, June 9, 1966, United States-Korea, 17 U.S.T. 1677, 1697-98, T.I.A.S. No. 6127, art.
XXII(7)(b). That provision requires South Korea to give "sympathetic consideration" to any
United States request to take custody of United States citizens sentenced by Korean courts
under the terms of the agreement.
In the early 1950's the idea of a prisoner serving a foreign sentence at home was discussed
briefly in the deliberations of the SOFA Working Group, but was abandoned. In their book
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT: CRIMINAL JUUSDICTION (1957). Joseph Snee and H. Ken-
neth Pye discussed the circumstances of this event:
It is interesting that no provision was inserted in the Agreement to take care of
the. . . situation [of] handing an accused over to the authorities of the sending State
[United States] for assistance in carrying out a sentence of imprisonment imposed by
the courts of the receiving State [other NATO nations]. The Portuguese Representa-
tive, during the discussion of Article VII, paragraph 8, suggested the addition of a
sentence to that paragraph to the effect that, in case of an offense punishable by a
heavy sentence in the receiving State, steps could be taken to hand over the accused
to the authorities of the sending State. It is not clear, however, whether he intended
that the sending State should carry out a sentence imposed by the receiving State, or
whether the purpose was to allow the receiving State to rid itself of an undesirable
alien without at the same time obliging the sending State to see to the execution of
the sentence. The amendment was withdrawn, the Chairman of the Working Group
[incorrectly] pointing out that the question had been dealt with in Article III, para-
graph 5 ....
Id at 103 (footnote omitted).
vided for the exchange of prisoners by multilateral agreement.28 The
concept was further developed in 1964 when the Council of Europe
entered into a convention 29 to resolve the difficulties that arose when
the courts of one country placed on probation or parole an offender
who subsequently returned to his home country. The convention au-
thorizes the home country to supervise the returning offender and to
imprison an offender who violates the terms of his parole or proba-
tion.3 °
More recently, the European Convention,3' which has been
adopted by nine countries including Turkey, outlined procedures for
one nation's enforcement of another nation's criminal sanctions
upon an offender. The European Convention encompasses the treat-
ment of offenders who remain at large,32 extends the reciprocity con-
cept to the payment of fines in addition to the completion of prison
terms, 33 and provides for the arrest of an offender at the request of
another nation.34 Similar to the Mexican and Canadian prisoner
transfer treaties, the European Convention accords the transferring
state the exclusive right to adjudicate any request for review of the
sentence.35 Unlike the Mexican and Canadian treaties, however, the
European Convention establishes that the prerogative of amnesty or
pardon is shared by both states. The Convention also enumerates
grounds for nonenforcement of a sentence by the receiving state, in-
cluding "where enforcement would run counter to the fundamental
principles of [that state's] legal system."' 36 As a signatory, Turkey
desired to utilize the European Convention as the basis for the pris-
oner transfer treaty with the United States.37 The two treaties are,
therefore, quite similar in format.
28. Convention Regarding the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Criminal
Matters, Mar. 8, 1948, Denmark-Norway-Sweden, 27 U.N.T.S. 117.
29. European Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally Sentenced or Condition-
ally Released Offenders, Nov. 30, 1964, Europ. T.S. 51, 2 Council of Europe, European Con-
ventions and Agreements 201 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Supervision Convention]. The
Scandinavian states of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden have a similar ar-
rangement called the Nordic Enforcement Law that is embodied in national legislation. See,
e.g., Law of May 22, 1963, [1963] Coll. Laws 399, as amended by Law of July 29, 1964, [1964]
Coll. Laws 1265 (Sweden). See Graltzner, International Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in
Criminal Matters, in 2 A. TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 216 n.113 (M. Bas-
siouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973).
30. Supervision Convention, supra note 29, at art. 16. See Note, 'Justice with Mercy":
The Treaties with Canada and Mexicofor the Execution of Penal Judgments, 4 BROOKLYN J.
OF INT'L L. 246, 255 (1978).
31. European Convention, supra note 8.
32. Id pt. II, § I, art. 2(a).
33. Id art. 2(b).
34. Id arts. 31-36.
35. Id art. 10(2).
36. Id art. 6(a).
37. Turkish Treaty, supra note 1, at V, Letter of Submittal, Message From the Secretary
of State to the President of the United States.
C Turkish Treaty Combines the Format of European Convention
with the Concept of Mexican Treaty
As early as 1977, Americans began to pressure the United States
Government to adopt a treaty with Turkey similar to the treaties
with Mexico and Canada.38 Public awareness of the problems faced
by United States citizens incarcerated overseas, heightened by liter-
ary and cinematic treatment of the subject, induced Congress to take
action.39
Although the procedure for transfer in the Turkish Treaty is
similar to that in the Mexican Treaty, the Turkish Treaty differs
from the Mexican Treaty in three principal respects attributable to
Turkey's desire to base the treaty on the European Convention.
40
Initially, the treaty provides exclusive grounds on which a state may
refuse a prisoner transfer.4' This provision reduces the possibility of
a due process attack by a prisoner who claims that United States
involvement with the foreign sentence has reached such a level that
our due process standards should apply. In the event that foreign
trial procedures are grossly inadequate, the United States will simply
invoke this provision and refuse to enforce the judgment. Note,
however, that this decision would strand the hapless prisoner in a
foreign prison, which was the problem to be remedied by the Turk-
ish Treaty.
Provisions for seizure and disposition of confiscated property
are another difference flowing from the European Convention.
These provisions are a requisite part of the Treaty because Turkish
civil-law penal judgments often include confiscation of property in
addition to deprivation of liberty. During negotiations, when the
38. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 14, at 84 (Department of State re-
sponse to a question for the record).
39. Raification Hearings, supra note 6, at 2. In his opening statement, Senator Church
remarked,
This country's public awareness of the problems faced by Americans imprisoned
overseas was heightened by the recent movie "Midnight Express." Certainly, no one
on this Committee would condone the violation of a foreign country's narcotics laws.
But, we all recognize the disparity between countries in prison facilities and handling
of prisoners.
Id
Similar to the earlier Mexican Treaty, the Turkish Treaty is intended to serve a threefold
purpose: relieve the special hardships of prisoners incarcerated overseas; enhance the possibil-
ity of rehabilitation; and relieve the strain on diplomatic and law enforcement relations caused
by imprisonment of each country's nationals in the prisons of the other. Turkish Treaty, supra
note 1, at V, Letter of Submittal, Message From the Secretary of State to the President of the
United States.
40. Turkish Treaty, supra note 1, at V, Letter of Submittal, Message from the Secretary
of State to the President of the United States. The most notable difference emanating from
molding the Turkish Treaty to the European Convention is the number of provisions required
to achieve the same result as the previous treaties. The Mexican Treaty is comprised of ten
articles, and the Canadian Treaty has eight. The Turkish Treaty, however, has twenty-nine
articles.
41. Turkish Treaty, supra note 1, art. V.
Turks were informed that United States penal judgments do not gen-
erally include seizure of property, they agreed that the obligation of
the requested state to enforce the seizures would be limited by that
state's laws.42 Thus, if Turkey requests the United States to provi-
sionally seize property, the United States may comply on the condi-
tion that its own law provides for seizure in similar cases.
43
Finally, the Turkish Treaty establishes an unprecedented mech-
anism for formal recognition of another country's penal judgment.
44
Previously, foreign penal judgments were implicitly recognized by
the United States Attorney General's action in accepting transfer of
a United States citizen from a foreign country and confining him in a
United States prison on the basis of his foreign conviction.45 Under
the Turkish Treaty, the Attorney General is designated the authority
competent to explicitly recognize a foreign judgment and is given
specific formal steps for affirming the validity of the judgment. ' Al-
though the Turkish Treaty differs from the Mexican Treaty in these
three respects, in operation it will function quite similarly.
47
III. The Turkish Treaty in Operation
A. The Turkish Legal System
To comprehend the context in which the treaty will operate, it is
helpful to have a basic understanding of the legal effect of treaties in
Turkey and of the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure.48
1. Legal Status of Treaties in Turkey. -In the Turkish hier-
archy of laws, international treaties stand in essentially the same cat-
egory as statutory law and are surpassed only by the Constitution.49
Like a statute, a treaty becomes enforceable only when approved by
the Turkish Grand National Assembly5 ° and promulgated in the Of-
42. Id at VII, Letter of Submittal, Message From the Secretary of State to the President
of the United States.
43. Id art. XXI.
44. Id art. XXIV.
45. Id at VIII, Letter of Submittal, Message From the Secretary of State to the President
of the United States.
46. Id art. XXIV(2).
47. See notes 63, 69-72, and accompanying text infra.
48. The Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure of April 20, 1929, (Law No. 1412) is a
translation of the German Code of Criminal Procedure of 1877. It has been amended signifi-
cantly by the Laws of June 17, 1936, June 7, 1937, June 28, 1938, January 30, 1942, and March
5, 1973, but is still in force today. See Golctlklu, Criminal Procedure, in INTRODUCTION TO
TURKISH LAW 210 (T. Ansay & D. Wallace eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Proce-
dure.
The Turkish Criminal Code is applicable to United States citizens tried for Turkish of-
fenses because of the principle of territoriality. This means that "whoever commits a crime in
Turkey shall be punished in accordance with Turkish law." Id at 176.
49. See Gariz, Sources of Turkish Law, in INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 6-9 (T.
Ansay & D. Wallace eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Sources of Turkish Law].
50. Article 65 of Turkey's Anayasa (Constitution) provides as follows:
ficial Gczette by the President.5 ' Unlike statutes, however, the con-
stitutionality of treaties may not be challenged. Accordingly, other
parties to a treaty may rely on its validity once it is enacted.
52
2. The Code of Criminal Procedure. -Turkish criminal trial
procedure is codified and follows a mixture of the inquisitorial sys-
tem, wherein the judge conducts the investigation, and the accusato-
rial system, wherein a public prosecutor investigates. The prosecutor
typically brings the matter before the court and is required to prove
the case. The judge, however, may initiate his own investigation to
determine facts.53 The proceeding progresses through successive
stages of preparatory investigation, preliminary investigation, and
final trial. The first two investigatory stages are based on a written
report and are conducted ex parte. The trial stage occurs in open
court, and the accused is allowed to confront the prosecution and
witnesses.5" The trial itself is protracted and may continue for three
years since only certain questions are addressed at each hearing.
55
Turkish law requires that the accused be present for at least one
hearing; then, if the court grants trial in absentia and the defendant
is allowed to post bail, the trial may be conducted in absentia. 6
The ratification of treaties negotiated with foreign States and international organiza-
tions in behalf of the Turkish Republic is dependent upon its approval by the Turk-
ish Grand National Assembly through the enactment of a law.
International treaties duly put into effect carry the force of law.
ANAYASA (Constitution) art. 65 (Turkey).
5 1. ld art. 93. The Official Gazette (Resmi Gazette) is published in Ankara daily, except
holidays. It includes not only statutes, but also regulations, by-laws, decrees, and official an-
nouncements. Sources of Turkish Law, supra note 49, at 14 n.23.
52. Sources of Turkish Law, supra note 49, at 7.
53. Criminal Procedure, supra note 48, at 209.
The procedure is similar to Mexico's two step proceeding that is comprised of the sumario
and plenario. During the sumario evidence is collected by interview and investigation by the
court itself. After the judge determines he has sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case, the parties are permitted to make any final additions to the record. The sumario is then
closed, and the plenario, a public hearing, is held. The case is then concluded and the judge
makes a finding of guilt or innocence. Chattin Case (United States v. Mexico), 1927 Opinions'
of Commissioners 422, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 282. The Chattin Case is cited in H. STEINER &
D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 367, 371-72 (2d ed. 1976). For a compilation of
materials on civil law proceedings, see Snee & Pye, Due Process in Criminal Procedure.: A
Comparison of Two Systems, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 471 n.18 (1960). For discussion of the
Chattin Case vis-a-vis Mexican trial proceedings, see Comment, Execution of Foreign
Sentences in the United States. A Treaty With Mexico, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 118, 122-25 (1977).
54. Criminal Procedure, supra note 48, at 209-10.
55. Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel James Miles, USAF, Member of Turk-
ish Treaty Negotiating Team, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 16, 1980). Lieutenant Colonel Miles'
statement was based on first-hand experience as defense counsel in Turkish courts.
56. THE TURKISH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, reprinted in 5 THE AMERICAN SE-
RIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (1962) [hereinafter cited as TURKISH CODE]. "If punishment
for a crime consists of light imprisonment, confiscation or a fine, or a combination of these, the
trial may proceed without the presence of the accused." Id § 225. "Except for crimes carrying
heavy punishment, the accused may, upon his own request, be excused from attending the
trial." Id § 226.
These provisions benefit American servicemen charged with offenses in Turkey. After a
serviceman is granted trial in absentia and posts bail, he can rotate from the country. Unless
A defendant may appeal the judgment or decisions rendered
prior to judgment57 only on the basis that the judgment is contrary to
law, which includes erroneous application of a procedural rule.5"
Upon reversal by the Court of Appeals (Supreme Court), a judgment
is remanded to the original court or to a different court of the same
type jurisdiction for a new trial.5 9
B. Mechanism for Transfer Under the Treaty
The Treaty will allow citizens of either party who have been
convicted in the courts of the other party to serve their prison
sentences in their own country. This is accomplished through a
process of formally recognizing the foreign penal judgment, effecting
the transfer of the prisoner, and then enforcing the judgment.60
In the Turkish Treaty, the terms "sentencing state" and "re-
questing state"'" refer to the country that convicted the offender and
that is requesting the other state to enforce its criminal judgment.
American military authorities assure the Turkish court of the soldier's return, the court does
not expect to see the accused again. Since foreign sentence can only be enforced against the
defendant if he returns, the trial has little effect. See, e.g., T. SNEE & H. PYE, STATUS OF
FORCES AGREEMENTS: CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 141-43 (1957). The possible disadvantages to
the serviceman of a conviction in absentia include prejudice to his future career in the United
States and risk of administrative discharge. Id at 143.
After the Turkish Treaty becomes effective, this procedural advantage may not be avail-
able. If a serviceman is convicted and sentenced by a Turkish court after he has left the coun-
try, Turkish competent authority may request the United States to recognize and enforce the
penal judgment. 48 U.S.C.A. § 955(b) (West Supp. 1979). The Treaty specifically provides
that when the sentenced person "is actually in the territory of the requested state at the time of
the request [the penal judgment] shall be enforced in that state under the provisions of this
Treaty." Turkish Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXIV(3). Although the offender's consent is re-
quired before a penal sanction may be enforced, under the new extradition treaty with Turkey,
supra note 2, the offender could simply be returned to Turkey. Therefore, he would probably
consent to serve his sentence in the United States.
Although servicemen in Turkey appear to have suffered a setback as a result of the
Treaty, in actuality they will enjoy the most sophisticated method of ensuring just treatment of
prisoners yet devised. Members of the force assigned in Turkey who have been accused of an
offense against Turkey enjoy the benefit of the seven procedural safeguards required by the
SOFA and the prospect of pretrial confinement in American facilities. See note 9 supra. In
addition, when the Turkish Treaty goes into effect, they will be able to serve the foreign penal
judgment in the United States. It is, in effect, a closed loop of protection that no other class of
persons in the world enjoys while in a foreign land.
57. TURKISH CODE, supra note 56, art. 306.
58. Id art. 307.
59. Id arts. 321, 322. A defendant may also file an appeal in absentia through counsel or
a representative. Id arts. 269, 273, 275.
60. The Turkish government will follow a slightly different procedure known as "exe-
quator" using article 23 of the Treaty when transferring a Turkish prisoner from the United
States to Turkey. Under this procedure, the United States judgment is recognized and the
Turkish courts are bound by the United States finding of fact under article 25. The United
States sentence is not binding, however, and a Turkish judge may pronounce a new sentence
when the prisoner returns to Turkey. See Turkish Treaty, supra note 1, at VIII, Letter of
Submittal, Message of the Secretary of State, to the President of the United States.
61. Id. at art. (a). The treaty defines "requesting state" or "sentencing state" as "the
[plarty which requests the recognition of the validity and enforcement of a penal judgment
. .. ." Id
The term "requested state" 62 refers to the nation that is being asked
to enforce the first nation's penal judgment. Thus, for example, an
American offender would transfer from the requesting state, Turkey,
to serve his sentence in the requested state, the United States.
1. Formal Recognition of Foreign Judgment. -A prisoner is eli-
gible to transfer if he has been convicted of an offense proscribed by
the laws of both countries, has at least six months to serve on his
sentence, is not a domiciliary of the country in which he is incarcer-
ated, and consents to the transfer.63 If these conditions are satisfied,
competent authority of the requesting state will initiate the request
64
62. Id art. I(b). "'Requested state' means the party which is asked to recognize the
validity of and to enforce a penal judgment."
63. Id art. IV. Voluntariness of the offender's consent to transfer was considered so
significant that extensive precautions to verify the voluntariness were included in the imple-
menting legislation:
The verification proceedings require that the offender personally appear before the
verifying officer in the country in which the sentence was imposed.
The verifying officer may be a United States magistrate, a judge of the United
States as defined in section 451 of title 28, United States Code, or a citizen specifically
designated by a judge of the United States as defined in section 451 of title 28, United
States Code.
The verifying officer must personally inform the offender of the conditions under
which the transfer may be made and determine that the offender understands them
and agrees to them. If necessary, an interpreter will be utilized. The right of the
offender to consult counsel and to have counsel appointed must be explained to him
by the verifying officer. The verifying officer is directed to make the necessary in-
quiries to determine that the offender's consent is voluntary and not the result of any
promises, threats, or other improper inducements. Such inquiries may be directed
not only to the offender but to any other person. The verifying officer may also con-
sider any document or physical evidence which will assist him in making his determi-
nation.
The entire proceedings must be recorded either by a reporter or by suitable
sound recording equipment.
To provide readily available evidence of the validity of the consent, a form to be
utilized at the proceeding will be prepared. The content of the form and instruction
for its use will be specified in the regulations.
H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38 (1977), reprintedin [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3146, 3160.
Since the Turkish government was adverse to allowing United States Magistrates to act in
a judicial capacity within Turkish borders, the verifying officer under the Turkish Treaty will
be "a citizen specifically designated by a judge of the United States." Id In practice, United
States Consuls will be appointed by the District of Columbia District Court to serve as verify-
ing officers. Telephone interview with Michael Abbell, Director, Office of International Af-
fairs, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (May 8, 1980).
In addition, the foreign prisoner will be given a prepared question and answer booklet
that contains answers to several questions about the treaty and its operation, the operation of
United States parole laws, and regulations of the United States Federal Prison system. See
note 115 infra.
64. This provision is similar to that in the Mexican Treaty wherein transfers are initiated
by the penal authority of the transferring (sentencing) state. Mexican Treaty, supra note 7, at
art. IV (1)(2). Under the Turkish Treaty a convicted offender may, however, ask the request-
ing state to initiate the request for recognition of his judgment. Turkish Treaty, supra note 1,
at art. XII(2).
In actual practice, the procedure in Turkey will probably evolve similar to that in Mexico.
A prisoner in Mexico now initiates the transfer himself. This procedure was discussed during
the Ratification Hearing:
Mr. Abbell: Under the treaty, .. the Mexican Government would initiate the
transfer of an American back to the United States. However, in practice, it has
evolved that our consular officers in Mexico, in cooperation with the Mexican Attor-
for recognition and enforcement of its penal judgment.65  The re-
quested state may then either accept or reject the request on the basis
of ten enumerated grounds. 66 After accepting the request to recog-
nize a foreign judgment, the requested state will formally recognize
the validity of that judgment.
2. Effecting the Transfer. -Following this formal recognition
of the penal judgment and determination by competent authority
that all conditions of the treaty have been met, the actual transfer is
arranged. The date and place for delivery of custody is determined
by mutual agreement of the parties. 67 Before the actual transfer oc-
curs, a final confirmation of the offender's continued consent to
transfer is made68 Following this, the prisoner is returned.
3. Enforcement of a Foreign Sentence.-Enforcement of the
judgment begins once a prisoner has arrived in his home country.69
At this point, the two countries share adjudicative authority over the
offender. The sentencing state has the exclusive right to decide "any
application for review of a sentence, all appeals or any other pro-
ceedings seeking to . . .invalidate conviction or sentences rendered
ney General's office and the Mexican equivalent of the Bureau of Prisons, [have]
worked out a system whereby the applications are made by the American prisoner to
the Mexican prison authorities and then forwarded through our diplomatic [pouches]
inside Mexico to the Embassy in Mexico City for presentation to the Mexican Gov-
ernment.
The Chairman. So, in reality, it is the prisoner himself who initiates it.
Mr. Abbell. Yes.
Ratifcation Hearings, supra note 6, at 28. (Statements of Michael Abbell, Director, Office of
International Affairs, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, and Senator Frank Church,
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
65. Turkish Treaty, supra note 1, at art. XII(l). Recognition of foreign judgments is
allowed under the doctrine of comity. As defined in the leading case, Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113 (1895), comity is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, execu-
tive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws.
Id at 164. For further discussion, see Note, "Justice with Mercy": The Treaties with Canada
and Mexico for the Execution of Penal Judgments, 4 BROOKLYN J. OF INT'L L. 246, 254 (1978).
66. Turkish Treaty, supra note 1, at art. V(a)-(j). Before accepting enforcement of the
sanction, the requested state must specify in a decision by the competent authority that several
requirements have been satisfied. The requested sanction must have been imposed in a final
criminal judgment. Id art. XXIII(a). The act for which the offender has been convicted must
be a crime under the laws of both countries. Id art. III. The six conditions of article IV must
be met. Id art. XXIII(b). The enforcement must not run counter to the fundamental legal
principles of the requested state. Id art. XXIII(c). The offender may not have been previously
acquitted or granted amnesty for the offense, nor may enforcement be barred by a statute of
limitations. Id art. XXIII(d). When the requested state determines that each of these enumer-
ated conditions and others specified in the treaty have been fulfilled, it must promptly inform
the authorities of the requesting state that it accepts enforcement of the penal judgment. Id
art. XVII(l).
67. Id art. XXVII.
68. Id
69. American prisoners who return from Turkey will become federal prisoners under the
implementing legislation. Ratication Hearings, supra note 6, at 22.
by one of its courts."7 In addition, the sentencing state retains ex-
clusive power to pardon or grant amnesty.7' Enforcement of the
sanction, however, is governed by the law of the requested state.
72
Thus, in America, the United States Parole Commission has jurisdic-
tion over prisoners returned under the Treaty73 and is authorized to
apply the parole laws of the United States to transferred offenders.74
In computing the duration of the transferee's term of imprison-
ment in the United States, the Parole Commission must take as its
basis the length of the sentence imposed by the Turkish court. The
Commission may then consider several other criteria, including the
sanction prescribed by American law for the same offense, to arrive
at a just sentence.75 Furthermore, all time served in a foreign prison
because of the foreign offense is credited toward the corresponding
American sentence. 76  Thus, in most respects, the transferred of-
fender is treated like an individual who had been sentenced in the
United States for the same offense. 7
IV. Challenges to the Treaty by American Prisoners
The majority of criticism of the Turkish Treaty by American
prisoners will arise in the context of a habeas corpus challenge to
continued imprisonment in a federal penitentiary. Two provisions
of the treaty are, therefore, likely to face attack: (1) Article IX,
70. Turkish Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IX(l).
71. Id art. IX(2).
72. Id art. XXVI(I).
73. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4106(a) (West Supp. 1979).
74. Id § 4106(b). In section-by-section analysis, the committee emphasized that
the parole determination criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. 4206 (and made specifically
applicable to transferred offenders by the instant legislation) shall be uniformly ap-
plied. In other words, the committee expects the U.S. Parole Commission to apply
the same standards and criteria to transferred offenders as are applied to U.S. offend-
ers.
H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3146, 3159.
75. Turkish Treaty, supra note i, at art. XXVI(2). According to the Treaty, four factors
that may be taken into consideration in enforcing the foreign sanction include,
(a) The sanction prescribed by its own law for the same offense,
(b) The minimum duration prescribed by the law of the requesting state for the
offense,
(c) Facts and legal causes specified in the judgment as mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and any additional information accompanying the request. Neverthe-
less, the requested state may not convert a sanction involving deprivation of liberty
into a fine,
(d) Any other facts and circumstances, particularly those occurring subsequent
to conviction which may have a bearing on the manner in which the sentences should
be executed.
Id
76. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4105(b) (West Supp. 1979).
77. Collateral effects of the foreign conviction with which the defendant must still con-
tend exist, however, including state double jeopardy, foreign conviction recognition by state
multiple offender statutes, and impeachment of a witness in an American trial by establishing
a previous foreign conviction. See generally Pye, The Effect ofForeign Criminal Judgments in
the United States, 32 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 114, 120-36 (1964).
which grants the sentencing state the exclusive right to decide all
challenges to the sentence; and (2) Article IV, which requires a pris-
oner's consent to transfer before his penal judgment may be en-
forced. In this context, the question arises: what avenues of
appellate review are available to the offender after he has consented
to transfer?
Article IX specifically prevents the prisoner's use of a United
States court to attack the sentence or conviction rendered by the for-
eign court.78 This does not preclude a challenge in a United States
court, however, that is not based on the foreign conviction or sen-
tence.79 Therefore, in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the
transferred prisoner may challenge the procedure utilized in his
transfer as not satisfying the statutory requirements and may chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the treaty or its implementing legisla-
tion.80 The returning offender may also claim lack of due process in
the foreign court. In other words, the treaty faces attack on grounds
that it is unconstitutional as applied, that it fails to guarantee due
process, and that it is unconstitutional on its face.
A. Transfer Provisions Were Illegally Applied
Once an American prisoner has transferred from Turkey he
may contend that his transfer did not satisfy the terms of the treaty
because he was transferred without his voluntary consent. The con-
tention would be based on the argument that the conditions of incar-
ceration in Turkey vitiated any voluntariness in the decision to
transfer. The prisoner would further argue that having been sub-
jected to duress, his consent was involuntary."' Therefore, he is
wrongly detained in federal prison since his transfer did not comply
with the consent provision of the treaty, and he is entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus.
78. Turkish Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IX(l). The article provides, "The sentencing
state alone shall have the right to decide on any applications' for review of a sentence, all
appeals, or any other proceedings seeking to challenge, modify, set aside, or otherwise invali-
date a conviction or sentences [sic] rendered by one of its courts." Id.
79. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3244(5) (West Supp. 1979). See H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., ist
Sess. 43 (1977) reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3146, 3165-66; Senate For-
eign Relations Hearings, supra note 14, at 84.
80. During the ratification hearings on the Turkish Treaty, the committee acknowledged
that a transferred offender could raise this contention. They believed, however, that the legis-
lative history of the treaties and the implementing legislation showed Senate concern for the
quality of the foreign proceedings, rendering the contention groundless. The decisions to date
have substantiated this analysis.
There have been six decisions, too, [sic] on Canadian cases, and four on Mexican
cases. . . in which [the courts] held the due process question was not one they would
consider, because . . . the United States, in entering the treaty, had considered the
legal procedures of those countries and found them sufficient, even though not pre-
cisely the same as ours.
Ratification Hearings, supra note 6, at 17.
81. See notes 86-89, 96, 97 and accompanying text infra.
Currently, two district court decisions have confronted this con-
tention emanating from essentially the same factual situations and
have reached opposite conclusions. 82 Both cases concerned the Mex-
ican Treaty, the terms of which are essentially identical to the Turk-
ish Treaty. In addition, both Mexico and Turkey are civil-law
countries with comparable trial procedures.83 Thus, the cases pres-
ent a background for discussion of possible challenges to the treaty.
In Velez v. Nelson,84 three Americans transferred from Mexico
after consenting to return to the United States. In recorded proceed-
ings before a United States magistrate, they swore under oath that
they had not been coerced into volunteering to transfer. 85 Upon re-
82. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1979), rev'd sub nom., Rosado v. Civi-
letti, Nos. 80-2001/3 (2d Cir. April 23, 1980),petitionfor cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. -(U.S. June
3, 1980) (No. 79-6690); Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 468 F. Supp. 920 (S.D. Cal.
1979), a-f'd, 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 48 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. June 9, 1980) (No.
79-6400). These two cases articulate the various criticisms of the prisoner transfer treaties.
Since, at this point, Velez awaits final disposition in the Supreme Court, and since it could
have a profound impact on the Turkish Treaty, it will be analyzed in depth.
Another district court decision, Mitchell v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Wis.
1980), followed the rationale of Pfeifer and denied a writ of habeas corpus to a transferred
prisoner.
In addition, several petitions for habeas corpus have been dismissed by other district
courts: Williams v. Ralston, No. 79-3166 (W.D. Mo., petition dismissed Mar. 21, 1980);
Kanasola v. Bell, No. 78-177 (E.D. Ky., petition denied Jan. 28, 1980, notice of appeal filed
Mar. 11, 1980); Cabello Villereal v. Keohne, No. 79-1003-D (W.D. Okla., petition denied Dec.
31, 1979); Orozco v. United States Bureau of Prisons, No. CV 78-2485 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24,
1979); Licata v. Fento, No. 79-807 (M.D. Pa., petition denied Oct. 30, 1979, notice of appeal
filed Nov. 6, 1979); Isbell v. United States Bureau of Prisons, No. CV 78-2400 (C.D. Cal.,
petition denied July 31, 1979); Ruiz v. Bell, No. 79-16 (M.D. Pa., petition dismissed June 29,
1979).
83. See note 53 supra, for a discussion of the countries' comparable trial procedures.
84. 475 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1979).
85. The form signed by petitioners contained the following statements:
I, - having been duly sworn by a verifying officer appointed under the laws
of the United States of America, certify that I understand and agree, in consenting to
transfer to the United States of America for the execution of the penal sentence im-
posed on me by a court of the United Mexican States, or of a state thereof, that:
1) My conviction or sentence can only be modified or set aside through appropriate
proceedings brought by me or on my behalf in the United Mexican States;
(2) My sentence will be carried out according to the laws of the United States of
America and that those laws are subject to change;
(3) If a court of the United States of America should determine upon a proceeding
brought by me or on my behalf that my transfer was not accomplished in accordance
with the treaty or laws of the United States of America, I may be returned to the
United Mexican States for the purpose of completing my sentence if the United Mex-
ican States requests my return; and,
(4) Once my consent to transfer is verified by the verifying officer, I may not revoke
that consent.
I further certify that:
(1) 1 have been advised of my right to consult with counsel, and have been afforded
the opportunity for such consultation prior to giving my consent to transfer;
(2) I have been advised that if I am financially unable to obtain counsel, one would
be appointed for me by the verifying officer free of charge; and,
(3) My consent to transfer is wholly voluntary and not the result of anypromises, threats,
coercion, or other improper inducements.
Form for Verification of Consent to Transfer to the United States of America for Execution of
Penal Sentence of United Mexican States. (Form DOJ-1978-04, available from United States
Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as
Consent Verification Form].
turn, they brought an action alleging that their consent was coerced
and not truly voluntary. In support of this allegation, petitioners
presented uncontroverted testimony on the conditions of their Mexi-
can incarceration. After being arrested without a warrant in Mexico,
they were detained, searched, and interrogated in connection with a
narcotics smuggling operation.86 For eight days they were subjected
to sustained physical torture in an effort to force them to sign "con-
fessions."87 None would sign the confession, and they were, subse-
quently, sent to Lecumberri Prison. At Lecumberri they were beaten
and forced to pay large sums of money for food, clothing, and cell
space.88 Eight months later they were informed that they had been
convicted of conspiring to import cocaine and had been sentenced to
nine years in prison. During their confinement, Mexican prison au-
thorities and certain powerful inmates demanded payment in return
for necessities, and petitioners lived in constant fear of bodily
harm.89 They had been in prisori nearly two years when they
learned of the prisoner transfer treaty from a United States Govern-
ment representative. Following proceedings before a magistrate, pe-
titioners were returned to United States custody on December 10,
1977, after twenty-five months of confinement.9"
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
reasoned that the consent required by the treaty must comport with
constitutional standards of voluntariness since the offender is
deemed to have waived certain constitutional rights as a conse-
quence of electing to transfer. The court relied on Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte9' to assert that the constitutional standard of voluntari-
ness is a question of fact to be determined from all surrounding cir-
cumstances including length of detention, prolonged nature of
questioning, and occurrence of physical punishment.92 Applying
these principles to the circumstances that precipitated petitioners'
consent to transfer, the court found under the unique facts of this
case that the consents were not truly voluntary and were, therefore,
invalid. Consequently, the United States lacked lawful custody over
the transferred offenders under the terms of the Treaty, and the writs
of habeas corpus were granted.93
Under almost identical facts, the district court for the Southern
86. 475 F. Supp. at 867.
87. Id at 869.
88. Id at 869-70.
89. Id at 873-74.
90. Id at 872.
91. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
92. 475 F. Supp. at 873.
93. Id at 874. Since the petitioners had already been released from federal prison on
parole when the ruling was issued, the effect was to remove them from parole altogether. Rati-
fication Hearings, supra note 6, at 15.
District of California reached the opposite conclusion and refused to
grant a writ of habeas corpus. In Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of
Prisons,94 petitioner brought habeas corpus proceedings95 seeking
release from a federal penitentiary in which be was serving the re-
mainder of a sentence originally imposed by a Mexican court for
importation of cocaine. Petitioner had been arrested at the Mexico
City airport in September 1977 after Mexican officials searched his
bags and found a can of powder alleged to be cocaine. He claimed
that he was subsequently beaten by five Mexican agents, tortured
with cattle prods, and forced to sign a confession that he was not
allowed to read.96 Without further hearings, he was held in prison
for six months and was subjected to deprivations and inhumane
treatment. On March 31, 1978, a Mexican court found him guilty
and sentenced him to seven years for importation of cocaine. 97
Twelve days later, pursuant to the procedures outlined in the imple-
menting legislation, a hearing was held before a United States mag-
istrate in Mexico. At the conclusion of the hearing, petitioner signed
the Consent Verification Form.98 In May 1978 the petitioner was
transferred to the Metropolitan Correctional Center in San Diego
from which he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 99
The two cases are factually indistinguishable. Both concerned
arrests in Mexico on charges of importation of cocaine and included
uncontroverted evidence of beatings and torture in efforts to produce
confessions. In both cases petitioners had been incarcerated for a
prolonged period without due process rights under allegedly inhu-
mane conditions.
In addressing the claim that petitioner did not voluntarily con-
sent because he was under "duress," the Pfeifer court found that the
record did not support petitioner's allegations.'o The district court
reasoned that the statutorally mandated consent verification proce-
dure was followed"0' and "[niothing in the record shows that the
magistrate's finding of a voluntary consent was clearly erroneous or
94. 468 F. Supp. 920 (S.D. Cal. 1979), aft'd, 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 48
U.S.L.W. - (U.S. June 9, 1980) (No. 79-6400).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
96. 468 F. Supp. at 922.
97. Petitioner also received a five year sentence for possession of counterfeit money,
which was to run consecutively to the seven year sentence. Id
98. See note 85, supra.
99. 468 F. Supp. at 922. At the court of appeals, Pfeiffer also alleged that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel and the right to appeal. These arguments were also rejected by
the court. 615 F.2d at 876.
100. 468 F. Supp. at 922. The district court finding was upheld by the Ninth Circuit. 615
F.2d at 877.
101. At his hearing, Pfeifer signed the consent verification form, and the magistrate at-
tested to the voluntariness of the consent both orally and in writing. The magistrate made all
the inquiries required of him under 18 U.S.C.A. § 4108 (West Supp. 1979). 468 F. Supp. at
922.
an abuse of discretion."' 2 In response to Pfeifer's specific conten-
tion that his consent was involuntary because he acted under "the
duress factor of having to stay in Mexico and be resubjected to dep-
rivation and inhumane treatment," the court noted that the threat of
having to stay in Mexico was simply petitioner's alternative to re-
turning to the United States; it was not the sort of "duress" that in-
validates consent. "Were Pfeifer's test for duress accepted, no
prisoner could consent to transfer" 103 because every prisoner eligible
to transfer under the treaties faces precisely the same choice. More-
over, petitioner stated under oath at the hearing that no one had
threatened or coerced him to sign the form."0 Utilizing this ration-
ale, the court found that petitioner's consent to transfer was volunta-
rily given and that the transfer complied with the terms of the treaty
and its implementing legislation. Accordingly, the petition for
habeas corpus was denied.'0 5
Of the two decisions, Pfeifer appears the better reasoned. The
Velez court's reliance on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte'° for the propo-
sition that "the determination of petitioners' consents is a question of
fact to be determined from all the surrounding circumstances"'0 7 is
ill-founded. Schneckloth concerned a search and seizure issue, and,
in dicta, the Supreme Court addressed the voluntariness of a confes-
sion. "8 The Velez court, relying on this dicta, applied the "totality
of the circumstances" test for voluntariness of a confession to the
transfer situation.
The Government appealed the district court's decision and the
Second Circuit correctly rejected the Schneckloth test, applying in-
stead the test evolved from cases construing the voluntariness of




105. Id at 927.
106. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
107. 475 F. Supp. at 873.
108. In its discussion of confessions, the court reasoned, "[I1n determining whether a de-
fendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances - both the characteristics of the accused and the details of interro-
gation." 412 U.S. at 226. The Court then enumerated some of the factors taken into account
to determine if defendant's will actually was overborne, including those listed by the Velez
court: length of detention, prolonged nature of questioning, and the occurrence of physical
punishment. Limiting its analysis to the circumstances surrounding a confession, the Court
concluded, "[I]n all of these cases, the Court determined the factual circumstances surrounding
the confession, assessed the psychological impact on the accused and evaluated the legal signif-
icance of how the accused reacted." Id (emphasis added). In addition, the actual holding in
Schneckloth is confined to the area of consent searches:
We hold only that when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State at-
tempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily
given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.
Id at 248.
109. Chief Judge Kaufman, writing for the court, reasoned that a standard of voluntari-
untariness of a guilty plea is determined by whether the defendant's
decision reflected a deliberate, intelligent choice between available
alternatives."' Since, in the case at bar, petitioners chose between
the alternatives of continued incarceration under brutal conditions
in a Mexican prison and transfer to American custody with the ad-
vantage of American laws governing parole, "it cannot be seriously
doubted that their decisions were voluntarily and intelligently
made."" 2 Thus, under a test for voluntariness that more closely ap-
proximates the transfer situation, the contention that the voluntari-
ness of a prisoner's consent to transfer is nullified by previous
mistreatment would fail.
Even if the totality of the circumstances test is accepted, how-
ever, the test was misapplied by the Velez court. The circumstances
surrounding the consent proceeding per se show that defendant's will
was not overborne. Considering the brevity of the proceedings, the
absence of prolonged questioning, and no evidence of physical pun-
ishment of the offender by Mexican or United States officials to force
him to sign the consent form, the court should have found no basis
for the contention of involuntary consent. Petitioners' previous mis-
treatment in Mexican prisons did not, therefore, destroy the volunta-
riness of their consent to transfer under the totality of circumstances
test.
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Mexican Treaty
shows that Congress was well aware of the conditions in Mexican
prisons, including the prison in which Velez was incarcerated, when
it ratified the treaty and passed the implementing legislation. "13 This
mistreatment was precisely the reason that the treaty was exe-
cuted. I4 Thus, for a petitioner to contend that the prison conditions
coerced him into involuntarily consenting to transfer is illogical and
ness designed to govern consensual searches and seizures within the United States was inappli-
cable to transfer situations.
Though we can find no case presenting facts on point to guide us in these extraordi-
nary circumstances, it is readily apparent that a decision whether to permit a police
officer to search one's car does not remotely resemble the choice presented to these
petitioners under the Treaty. In our view the choice that faces an American impris-
oned in Mexico in deciding whether to transfer more closely resembles a decision
confronted by nearly every criminal defendant today: whether to plead guilty and
accept a set of specified sanctions ranging from probation to a possibly long prison
sentence, or to stand trial and face unknown dispositions ranging from possible ac-
quittal to a severe maximum sentence or even death. In the plea bargaining context,
as in the case at bar, the choice involves liberty and incarceration on both sides of the
equation.
Rosado v. Civiletti, Nos. 80-2001/3, slip op. at 2546 (2d Cir. April 23, 1980).
110. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
111. Id at 37-38.
112. Rosado v. Civiletti, Nos. 80-2001/3, slip op. at 2548 (2d Cir. April 23, 1980).
113. See notes 5 and 19 supra.
114. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra (rationale and purpose of the treaty).
unrealistic. I 5  It directly contradicts the fact that fully twenty per-
cent of the Americans imprisoned in Mexico decided to stay when
initially given the opportunity to transfer." 6 Additionally, if brutal
prison conditions were permitted to determine the voluntariness of a
prisoner's consent to transfer, those now incarcerated who desper-
ately need to transfer would never be able to satisfy the magistrate
that their consents were voluntary." 7
Moreover, Congress was aware that problems of proof would
arise concerning the voluntariness of the consent and, therefore, pro-
vided an elaborate procedure to guarantee that the prisoner's deci-
sion was uncoerced. 18 Permitting the transferred offender to
contend that circumstances outside the proceeding coerced his deci-
sion controverts the clear legislative intent behind the consent verifi-
cation proceeding. This aspect of the Velez holding would have put
later transferees on notice that once safely inside the United States
they could successfully allege the involuntariness of their consent
when seeking habeas corpus relief and that the government would be
powerless to disprove their allegations. The Second Circuit conse-
quently refused to affirm Velez. I19
115. A more plausible reason for petitioners' decision to transfer is the simple prospect of
improved living conditions in the United States:
[Incarceration in one's own nation facilitates contact with family, friends, and legal
counsel. Furthermore, rehabilitation may be enhanced within an institution in which
an offender can obtain suitable vocational training and education in his or her own
language and culture. Possibilities of work release and arrangements for post-release
employment are greater when contact with prospective employers is possible. The
possibility of discrimination against an offender because of "foreign" status would
also be reduced.
Abramovsky & Eagle, A Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanc-
tions Treaty, 64 IOWA L. REV. 275, 298 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
Another reason for desiring transfer is the immediate eligibility for parole. The question
and answer booklet given the prisoners while still incarcerated in Mexico provided them with
sufficient information to estimate the customary range of months they would serve in Ameri-
can prison before release on parole. For their offense, possession of hard drugs with intent to
distribute on a large scale, the customary range is forty to fifty-five months. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, INFORMATION BOOKLET FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS INCARCERATED IN MEXICAN
PRISONS REGARDING THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED MEXICAN
STATES AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE EXECUTION OF PENAL SENTENCES 9,
app. C [hereinafter cited as Information Booklet]. Thus, petitioners were most likely aware
that by transferring they would be released within a short time since they had already served
twenty-five months. If they remained in Mexico they would be required to serve the full seven
year sentence. This time differential may well have been their prime motivation.
116. Ratification Hearings, supra note 6, at 29. See also Hearings on Treaty with Bolivia on
the Execution of Penal Sentences Before the Senate Comrm on Foreign Relations, S. EXEC. REP.
No. 22, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978) (statement of Michael Abbell, Special Ass't to the Ass't
Att'y Gen. Crim. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice and Director of Prisoner Transfer Program).
117. See Rosado v. Civiletti, Nos. 80-2001/3, slip op. at 2545 n.31 (2d Cir. April 23, 1980).
118. See Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 19, at 55. "To minimize the litigation
problems which may arise it has been deemed desirable for the United States to verify the
consent in each case and to have the verification procedure included in the implementing
legislation." Id See also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 14, at 47 (statement of
Hon. Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Advisor, Department of State). "[T]he problems that would be
involved in holding hearings in a U.S. court to determine precisely what happened in a remote
Mexican police station might well be insurmountable." Id
119. Rosado v. Civiletti, Nos. 80-2001/3, slip op. at 2567-68 (2d Cir. April 23, 1980).
If sustained by the Supreme Court, Velez could have a devastat-
ing effect on the validity of the entire series of prisoner transfer trea-
ties.' 20  In fact, the Mexican Government delivered a diplomatic
protest over the Velez ruling and threatened to suspend future trans-
fers under the Treaty. 12' In reversing Velez, the Second Circuit
wisely discerned that the interests of those Americans currently in-
carcerated abroad are of paramount importance and refused "to
scuttle the one certain opportunity open to Americans incarcerated
abroad to return home ... ,22
B. Continued Imprisonment Involves United States Government in
Trial Without Due Process
A second major challenge facing the Turkish Treaty is that the
United States Government's taking custody of an American citizen
for service of a sentence imposed in an unfair foreign trial is govern-
mental involvement in an unconstitutional proceeding. 23 The sub-
stance of the claim is that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment prohibits such imprisonment if the foreign conviction
was obtained by procedures lacking the safeguards of the Bill of
Rights, and, therefore, the offender should be freed by writ of habeas
corpus. Accordingly, this contention raises two issues: whether the
constitutional due process safeguards apply to American citizens
tried outside the United States; and, if not, whether enforcement of
the foreign sentence constitutes sufficient involvement in the foreign
120. See Vagts, A Reply to "'A Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of
Penal Sanctions Treaty," 64 IOWA L. REV. 325, 334 (1979). See also Senate Foreign Relations
Hearings, supra note 14, at 95.
What occurs to me is perhaps the single most important thing to focus on at this
point. That is the fact . . . that if a handful of these early prisoners were to be
released by the American courts, that would abort the program. In a very real sense,
I gather, from the position taken by the Executive and the record made by the Execu-
tive, the Mexicans particularly, and the Canadians presumably, would not continue to
consent to or abide by the removal plan if the U.. courts began to judge and review
their sentencing.
Id (statement of Alan C. Swann, witness) (emphasis added).
121. Rosado v. Civiletti, Nos. 80-2001/3, slip op. at 2530 n.10 (2d Cir. April 23, 1980).
122. Id at 2568. The court noted that as of March 23, 1980, 226 Americans were still
incarcerated in Mexico. Since ratification of the Treaty, 451 Americans had transferred to
United States custody. Id at n.45.
The court also realized the effect of its decision on prisoner transfer treaties with other
countries including Turkey. "Whatever hope the Treaty extends of escaping the harsh realities
of confinement abroad will be dashed for hundreds of Americans if we permit these three
petitioners to rescind their agreement to limit their attacks upon their convictions to Mexico's
courts." Id. at 2568.
123. This argument was raised unsuccessfully by petitioner in Pfeiffer v. United States
Bureau of Prisons, 468 F. Supp. 920, 922-23 (S.D. Cal. 1979). Under the Turkish Treaty, the
provision in article V for refusal of a transfer when enforcement of the sentence would counter
the fundamental legal principles of the state further reduces the likelihood of a successful
attack on these grounds. See note 66 and accompanying text supra. Nonetheless, the conten-
tion may still be raised. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
trial to invoke these constitutional safeguards upon return to the
United States.
1. Territorial Sovereignty. -In international law exclusive ter-
ritorial jurisdiction is one of the basic attributes of sovereignty.
States are, therefore, prohibited from exercising jurisdiction within
another sovereign's territory."' Thus, if a foreign citizen commits
an offense in the United States, he is tried in United States courts
under United States standards rather than under his nation's law.
Similarly, when a United States citizen commits an offense against a
foreign state he is tried in that state under its corresponding stan-
dards. In short, unless treaties provide otherwise,'25 the United
States Constitution does not extend extraterritorially.
This principle was illustrated in Neely v. Henkel'26 in the analo-
gous situation of extradition proceedings. In that case, a United
States citizen contested extradition to a foreign country under a fed-
eral statute on grounds that the statute "does not secure to the ac-
cused, when surrendered to a foreign country for trial in its tribunals,
all of the rights, privileges, and immunities that are guaranteed by
the Constitution to persons charged with the commission in this
country of crime against the United States."' 27 The Supreme Court's
answer to this contention was that "those provisions [of the Constitu-
tion concerning fundamental guarantees such as the writ of habeas
corpus] have no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdic-
tion of the United States against the laws of a foreign country."'
' 28
This principle of territorial sovereignty was later applied in
Holmes v. Laird129 in which American servicemen were tried in
West Germany for the rape of a West German woman.'30 Because
124. S. LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
LAW 7 (1971).
125. See, e.g., NATO SOFA, supra note 9, at art. VII(3) (authorizing trial in United States
military courts of some offenses committed by United States citizens in foreign lands).
126. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
127. Id at 122.
128. Id The court continued,
In connection with the above proposition, we are reminded of the fact that the
appellant is a citizen of the United States. But such citizenship does not give him an
immunity to commit crime in other countries, nor entitle him to demand, of right, a
trial in any other mode than that allowed to its own people by the country whose
laws he has violated and from whose justice he has fled. When an American citizen
commits a crime in a foreign country, he cannot complain if required to submit to
such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe
for its own people, unless a different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations
between that country and the United States.
Id at 123.
129. 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
130. Procedurally, the suit was brought in a United States District Court as a consequence
of the servicemen leaving West Germany without authorization. When they returned to the
United States they surrendered to Army officials who were obligated to return the men to West
Germany under the NATO SOFA. NATO SOFA, supra note 9. Before the Army could act,
the servicemen sued in federal district court to enjoin their return to West Germany.
their trial failed to comply with the constitutional standard of the
Bill of Rights,' 3' the servicemen maintained that they could not be
forced to serve the sentences. The court, however, found Neely dis-
positive:
What we learn from Neely is that a surrender of an American
citizen required by treaty for purpose of a foreign criminal pro-
ceeding is unimpaired by an absence in the foreign judicial system
of safeguards in all respects equivalent to those constitutionally
enjoined upon American trials.
Since the United States Constitution does not apply to foreign trials
for foreign offenses, American offenders in foreign prisons have no
basis for claiming that their trials failed to comply with the Bill of
Rights.
The critical question, therefore, is whether United States en-
forcement of a sentence that is the product of a foreign criminal pro-
ceeding that lacked United States due process safeguards is sufficient
involvement in the proceeding to render the Constitution applica-
ble. 133 In Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons the district court
addressed this governmental involvement issue. 134 In that case, peti-
tioner argued that "the custody of an American citizen for service of
a sentence imposed in culmination of an unfair foreign trial is a gov-
ernmental involvement that the Constitution does not tolerate.' 35
The court found Holmes v. Laird'3 6 controlling and concluded that
"the Treaty does not run afoul of the Constitution simply because it
provides for the incarceration in the United States of American [sic]
citizens whose foreign trials did not comply with the Bill of
Rights." 37 This same conclusion was reached by the Department of
13 1. Petitioners claimed they were denied a speedy trial, counsel of their choice, and a fair
appeal. They also contended representation by German counsel was ineffective because of the
language barrier and that they were not permitted to confront the witnesses. 459 F.2d at 1214.
132. 459 F.2d at 1219. See also Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) (upholding delivery
of a United States citizen to Japan for trial not complying with United States Constitution);
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
133. A close analogy is the transfer of prisoners between or within state facilities in the
United States. In an interstate transfer the sending state continues to have jurisdiction over the
sentence, although carried out in the receiving state. The Western Interstate Corrections Com-
pact, for example, specifically provides that "the receiving state [is] to act in that regard solely
as agent for the sending state" and that proceedings concerning the sentence are to be the sole
responsibility of the sending state. Western Interstate Corrections Compact, reprinted in CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11190, art. IV(a) (Deering 1980). The practice of regarding the conviction and
sentence as the "creature" of the sentencing state is clearly established. Vagts, supra note 120,
at 333.
134. 468 F. Supp. at 921-24.
135. 1d at 922-23.
136. 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
137. 468 F. Supp. at 924. The court concluded picturesquely,
America is not vicariously liable for the acts of another nation. Consequently, as
in Holmes, the fifth amendment permits the United States to enforce the sentences
meted out by foreign courts, even if those sentences were 'unconstitutionally' pro-
cured. American custody of convicts originally tried and imprisoned in Mexico, as in
Pfeifer's case, is simply another form of enforcing a foreign sentence.
Id
State and the Department of Justice in hearings preceding the first
prisoner transfer treaty. 38 Standing alone, the act of enforcing a
sentence rendered in a foreign trial lacking constitutional safeguards
does not sufficiently implicate the United States government in the
conviction to entitle the prisoner to a new trial or to release.
C Treaty Facially Unconstitutional Because Requires Invalid
Waiver of Habeas Corpus
A third contention confronting the Turkish Treaty is that the
transfer of prisoners is invalid because Articles IV and IX 139 require
an invalid waiver of the constitutional right to habeas corpus. The
Velez and Preifer decisions, however, evidence that the treaty would
not entirely eliminate habeas corpus relief. Rather, the treaty elimi-
nates a collateral attack on the Turkish conviction in the United
States courts. This raises the question of whether the constitution-
ally guaranteed right of habeas corpus can be waived to this extent.
Assuming the possibility of a waiver, the question remains whether
the treaty requirements provide a valid waiver of the right to habeas
corpus relief, i e., knowing, intelligent, and voluntary? 1"
Under the concept of territorial sovereignty discussed in the pre-
vious section, an offender tried in a foreign court for a foreign crime
is not entitled to the protections guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. While incarcerated in a foreign jail, the offender pos-
sesses no right to challenge his foreign conviction by habeas corpus
in United States courts. Only upon return to the United States does
138. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 14, at 82 ("[A]cceptance of the
transfer of prisoners from Canada or Mexico would not represent such involvement in the
prior proceedings in those countries as to render the Constitution of the United States applica-
ble to them retroactively."); H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 51 (1977) (statement of
Peter H. Flaherty, Deputy Attorney General, United States Department of Justice), reprinted
in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3146, 3173-74.
139. In addition, the implementing legislation provides,
When a treaty is in effect between the United States and a foreign country pro-
viding for the transfer of convicted offenders - (I) the country in which the offender
was convicted shall have exclusive jurisdiction and competence over proceedings
seeking to challenge, modify, or set aside convictions or sentences handed down by a
court of such country ....
18 U.S.C.A. § 3240 (West Supp. 1979).
The waiver of habeas corpus is not explicit in the Treaty or its implementing legislation.
Before accepting enforcement of the penal judgment, the requested state must satisfy itself and
specify in a decision that the transfer meets the conditions of articles III and IV. Turkish
Treaty, supra note I, at art. XXIII. One condition is that the transfer must be with "the con-
sent of the sentenced person." Id art. IV(f). The enabling legislation also specifically requires
that the offender understand the consequences of the transfer before consenting, including the
fact that he will not be able to challenge the foreign conviction or sentence in a United States
court. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4108(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979). Although never explicitly labeled, this
provision apparently serves as a waiver of the writ of habeas corpus. See House Judiciary
Hearings, supra note 15, at 267.
140. For a detailed discussion of the waiver of habeas corpus, see Robbins, A Constitu-
tional Analysis of the Prohibition Against Collateral Attack in the Mexican-American Prisoner
Exchange Treaty, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1978).
he actually acquire this right. The waiver provision, therefore, is a
double protection for the United States and foreign court systems
because even if the offender could be said to possess the right to
collaterally attack through habeas corpus, he would have validly
waived it.
1. Habeas Corpus is Waivable.-It is uncontroverted that one
may waive a right to which he is otherwise entitled.' 4 ' Accordingly,
the right of habeas corpus was found waivable in the landmark case
of Fay v. Noia. "42 In Fay, the defendant in a murder trial failed to
appeal his conviction to a state court of appeals within the prescribed
time limit and later sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court. The writ was denied on the ground that he failed to exhaust
his state remedies within the meaning of federal statutory require-
ments. 43 The Court held that "the federal habeas judge may in his
discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed
the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited
his state court remedies.'"44 The federal remedy of habeas corpus
may be waived if the applicant understandingly and knowingly "for-
went the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the
state courts."
45
The right of habeas corpus can also be waived by failure to
comply with a state contemporaneous objection rule that, in essence,
bars subsequent review of objections not raised during the original
trial. In Wainwright v. Sykes, ' 46 a defendant being tried for third
degree murder failed to challenge the admissibility of inculpatory
statements made by himself to police officers. Subsequent to convic-
tion, defendant initiated a habeas corpus action in federal district
court asserting that his statements were inadmissible by reason of his
lack of understanding of the Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court
ruled that, absent a showing of cause for failing to object at trial and
resultant prejudice, failure to follow the state's contemporaneous ob-
jection rule was a waiver of habeas corpus. 1 47 In Wainwright, habeas
141. See, e.g., Pierce v. Somerset Ry., 171 U.S. 641 (1898). "A person may by his acts or
omission to act waive a right which he might otherwise have under the Constitution of the
United States as well as under a statute. ... Id at 648. Significantly, the following rights
have all been found waivable: the right to trial by jury, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969); the right to counsel, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); the right to confronta-
tion, Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); and the right to be free from double jeopardy,
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
142. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
144. 372 U.S. at 438.
145. Id at 439.
146. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
147. Id at 90-91. "If a criminal defendant thinks that an action of the state trial court is
about to deprive him of a federal constitutional right there is every reason for his following the
state procedure in making known his objection." Id. at 90.
corpus was implicitly waived by an act of omission. The treaty goes
a step further and requires that the right be explicitly waived by an
act of commission.
2. Treaty Provides Valid Waiver. -Notwithstanding the allow-
ance of a waiver, the treaty provisions for express consent must be
examined to determine whether the treaty provides a valid waiver of
the right in accordance with constitutional standards. The original
test for a valid waiver, enunciated by the Court in Johnson v.
Zerbst, 48 required that a waiver be knowing and intelligent. To
that test, later cases have added a third element, voluntariness. 1
49
(a) Knowing waiver.-The Turkish Treaty explicitly provides
that both states must ensure that the sentenced person gave his con-
sent to transfer. 5 ° The implementing legislation additionally re-
quires that the offender's consent be personally verified as made
"with full knowledge of the consequences thereof' by a United
States magistrate or a specifically designated individual.' 5 ' To en-
sure that the offender has full knowledge of the consequences of his
consent, the legislation specifies that the verifying officer must in-
form him of the conditions under which the transfer may be made
and determine that he understands them.'52 If a language problem
exists, an interpreter is provided. The offender has the right to con-
sult counsel and to have counsel appointed if he is financially unable
to obtain an attorney.' 53 In addition to these measures, the offender
will have been previously provided a question and answer booklet
dealing extensively with the operation of the Treaty. 5 4 Clearly, the
procedures are designed to adequately inform the offender of the
ramifications of his consent to transfer under the Turkish Treaty and
fully satisfy the "knowing" requirement of a valid waiver.
(b) Intelligent waiver.-To ensure that the prisoner's consent to
transfer is given intelligently, the implementing legislation directs
that a verifying officer, usually a United States magistrate, must per-
sonally conduct verification proceedings with the offender and make
necessary inquiries to determine that his consent is voluntary. These
inquiries may be directed not only to the prisoner but also to any
other person. The officer may consider any other documents or
148. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
149. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973); Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
150. Turkish Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. IV(f), XXIII(b).
151. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4108(a) (West Supp. 1979).
152. Id § 4108(b).
153. Id § 4109.
154. INFORMATION BOOKLET, supra note 116. See note 63 supra.
physical evidence that will assist him in making the determina-
tion. 55  In addition, the offender has the opportunity to consult
counsel before the final consent to transfer is given, which further
ensures that the consent will be intelligently rendered.
(c) Voluntary waiver.-The third requirement of a valid waiver
is that it be voluntarily given. 56 Congress attempted to guarantee as
far as possible in the administrative setting that the offender's con-
sent would actually be voluntary. 57 To ensure voluntariness, the
procedure for verification of consent contained in the implementing
legislation incorporates those safeguards against involuntary waivers
utilized in the guilty plea setting in United States courts.'58 After a
hearing in which the offender is assisted by counsel, a verifying of-
ficer must determine that the offender's consent is voluntary and
"not the result of any promises, threats, or other improper induce-
ments."'' 59 The entire proceeding is recorded and the offender's con-
sent is noted on a form together with the verifying officer's
affirmation that the consent is "wholly voluntary."' 6 ° If followed,
this procedure certainly satisfies the constitutional requirements of
voluntariness in waiver situations.
Despite extensive procedural safeguards to ensure that the con-
sent is voluntary, one thorny issue remains: can the offender volun-
tarily consent to transfer when he has no real choice? This issue was
raised in Congress by Senator Griffin, who maintained that if the
consent is inherently involuntary because no viable alternative to
transferring exists, then it is invalid regardless of what procedures
are employed. 16' This "no choice" argument is faulty because an
155. H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 37 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3146, 3160.
156. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). "It was error, plain on the
face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative
showing that it was intelligent and voluntary." Id
157. See Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 19, at 2, 25-26, 138; 123 CONG. REC. 24,272
(1977) (remarks of Senator Javits).
158. In the guilty plea setting courts have established several criteria for a valid waiver:
the determination of waiver must be personally made by a judge, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 242-44 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464-67 (1969); the waiver may be
made after consulting counsel, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 265 (1973); an affirmative
showing must be made that the waiver is voluntary and knowing, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 242 (1969); the record must indicate that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
159. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4108(d) (West Supp. 1979).
160. See note 85 supra for the first part of the form. The verifying officer signs the follow-
ing statement: "Based on the proceedings conducted before me, I find that the above consent
was knowingly and understandingly given and is wholly voluntary and not the result of any
promises, threats, coercion, or other improper inducements." Consent Verification Form,
supra note 85.
161. 123 CONG. REC. 24,271 (1977) (individual views of Sen. Griffin).
[The prisoner's] alternatives are incarceration in this country or continued confine-
ment in Mexico. The alternative of remaining in Mexico is so unattractive to most
prisoners that in reality these individuals are left with but one choice - incarceration
American citizen incarcerated in a foreign jail has no United States
constitutional right to habeas corpus. He has the right of a citizen of
that country to appeal or bring an action similar to habeas corpus in
the foreign court. By accepting the offer to transfer conditioned
upon the relinquishment of the capacity to bring habeas corpus
based on the foreign conviction, he has surrendered no vested
right. 1
62
In addition, although the option to transfer has been labeled a
"Hobson's Choice"' 63 the prisoner does indeed have an alternative.
Since twenty percent of those prisoners initially offered the opportu-
nity to transfer from Mexican prisons decided to remain, a very real
choice must exist.
Finally, the difficulty of the choice for a particular individual
should not prevent the government from extending him the offer.
Under the treaty, the government allows the prisoner to choose be-
tween staying in a foreign prison and returning to the United States
on the condition that he not collaterally attack the foreign sentence
or conviction. Although the choice is perhaps unpleasant, the gov-
ernment is permitted to pose it. In Brady v. United States"6 the
Court decided that even when confronted with the possibility of a
death penalty, a defendant could knowingly and intelligently plead
guilty to a crime, fully aware that the guilty plea would automati-
cally preclude the death sentence.1 65 If a plea submitted in fear of
the death penalty is not "inherently involuntary," a fortiori the con-
sent to transfer given in fear of continued mistreatment in foreign
jails is not inherently involuntary. Thus, an individual may be re-
quired to make a difficult choice, but his consent to transfer need not
be characterized as inherently involuntary. Since the "no choice"
argument fails, an offender may voluntarily waive the capacity to
collaterally attack the foreign conviction or sentence.
in this country. To deprive an individual of his right to challenge his Mexican con-
viction under such circumstances conflicts with fundamental notions of fairness.
Some commentators contend that this deficiency may be overcome by surround-
ing the consent or waiver process with various procedural safeguards. . . .It is diffi-
cult to perceive, however, how the implementation of these procedures will render
the consent or waiver voluntary. In fact, such discussion obscures the crucial issue. If
the consent or waiver is deemed inherently involuntary, then it is invalid no matter what
procedures are employed
Id (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
162. One commentator characterized the choice as follows:
Arguably, [the prisoner] only agrees not to acquire the right to habeas corpus by
accepting American imprisonment. . . .In addition, by not receiving the benefits of
confinement in the United States, the prisoner is neither gaining nor retaining the
habeas corpus right. So, in one sense, the choice presented is to acquire the benefit
and not the right, on the one hand, and to acquire neither the benefit nor the right, on
the other hand.
Robbins, supra note 140, at 40. See notes 124-32 and accompanying text supra.
163. -See Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 19, at 235.
164. 397 U.S. 742 (1969).
165. Id at 748.
V. Conclusion
The Turkish Treaty is a positive step toward the amelioration of
both international friction over foreign incarceration of nationals
and the personal hardships attendant upon foreign imprisonment. 1
66
It faces potential difficulty if the Supreme Court adopts the Velez
rationale, since it will be vulnerable to attack on grounds that a pris-
oner's consent to transfer was involuntary. The Second Circuit's re-
versal of Velez should be affirmed 1 67 and contentions that the treaty
fails, to guarantee due process 68 and that it is unconstitutional on its
face 69 should be rejected by the courts, to allow this humanitarian
treaty to succeed in its purpose.
DAVID F. SHUTLER
166. See notes 5, 22-24 and accompanying text supra
167. See notes 106-22 and accompanying text supra
168. See notes 124-38 and accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 148-65 and accompanying text supra.

